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Abstract
The goal of this paper is to examine if there are any determinants that 
systematically influence the capital structure of the companies in the Balkan 
countries and to determine if any of the existing capital structure theories are 
relevant in their case. We apply a panel regression on a sample consisting of the 
largest and most frequently traded joint-stock companies from four countries. The 
results show that the larger companies and those with higher fixed asset 
investments exhibit higher leverage, while the more profitable companies and 
those with more tangible assets use less debt financing. Other variables, such as 
the concentration of company ownership, the riskiness of its operating profits and 
the effective tax rates have not been found statistically significant. These results, 
supported by the robustness tests, have confirmed our expectation that the 
managers in these countries do not set specific target leverage ratios, but instead 
follow a particular order in the selection of the sources of financing. In other 
words, the companies behave in accordance with the pecking order theory, which 
is a confirmation of our initial hypothesis. The governments of these countries 
should put more effort on stimulating the use of other sources of financing to 
relieve the possible excessive company dependence on the banking sector.
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1. Introduction
After Modigliani and Miller had set the basis of the capital structure theory in 
their seminal paper from 1958, extensive research in this field emerged, aimed at 
supplementing their findings. In the beginning, this research was mostly focused 
on recommending a so-called optimal capital structure as a targeted debt-to-equity 
ratio that would minimize the overall costs of financing. After the works of Myers 
(1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984), the emphasis changed toward exploring the 
factors that influence the capital structure under different settings and the objective 
of the research has shifted towards explaining the reasons companies behave in a 
particular fashion with respect to their financing, instead of trying to determine a 
one-size-fits-all solution.
In the last two decades, after the collapse of the socialist system and the emergence 
of a new economic reality in Eastern Europe, considerably different from the 
existing economic paradigms, a new field for exploration emerged in the economic 
science. Namely, contemporary corporate finance is mostly built upon the findings 
of studies implemented in the mature market economies, most notably the USA. 
However, it becomes obvious that this wisdom does not exactly match the reality 
even in the developed countries of continental Europe, not to mention the post-
transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe, (Mramor and Valentinčič, 
2001; Peev, 2001; Filatotchev et al., 2003; Yeoh, 2007; Bena and Hanousek, 2008; 
Cvijanovic and Redžepagić, 2011).
The analysis of the capital structure in the post-transition economies of the Balkan 
countries (with the exception of Slovenia), has been overlooked by the extant 
literature and to the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to examine this 
issue. Our research is centred on four countries: Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia and 
Slovenia. Each of these economies individually seems to be unattractive from 
academic point of view, most likely because of their size, small available samples, 
short time series, etc. This paper tries to make a modest contribution towards filling 
this gap. By extending our field of research to several countries, we expect to 
obtain a sufficiently large basis for drawing relevant conclusions. We follow the 
methodology applied in previous studies of this kind. Working with a set of six-
year financial data for the sample of 172 companies, we apply a panel regression 
analysis using fixed and random effects models. 
The primary goal of the paper is to determine if there are any firm-specific factors 
that systematically influence the capital structure of the companies in the post-
transition economies in the Balkans. We find it important to explore how these 
factors compare to the findings of similar studies for other countries (Gonenc, 
2003; Bauer, 2004; Berk, 2007; Črnigoj and Mramor, 2009; Teker et al., 2009, 
etc.). Our intention is to try to model the behaviour of financial managers if certain 
common patterns are discovered. Knowledge of this kind could help us develop 
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general conclusions about larger groups of countries, in this case the post-transition 
economies. The detection of the capital structure determinants would also enable 
us to identify the theory that best describes the capital structure decision-making 
practices in these countries. On the basis of these findings, we intend to derive 
conclusions regarding the probable causes and implications of these practices.
Having in mind the characteristics of the analyzed economies, i.e. the shallow 
capital markets, low corporate tax rates, the importance of banks and the informal 
company-bank relationships, as well as taking into account the findings from 
previous studies on the post-transition economies, our basic hypothesis is that it 
is the pecking order theory that could find support in the empirical data. In other 
words, our initial assumption is that the companies in the region do not set target 
debt-equity ratios, but rather utilize their own funds and once they are exhausted, 
they resort to borrowing. Issuing equity is the last choice.
The second part of the paper presents a review of the most relevant literature in 
the field. It provides a brief insight into the most representative contributions that 
laid down the fundaments of the capital structure theory. The third section contains 
an elaboration of the research methodology. First, we make an overview of the 
existing studies on determinants of capital structure and then on the basis of these 
experiences, we develop our hypotheses and the regression model. The fourth 
section contains information on the sample used and the features of the financial 
sectors of the analyzed countries. The results of the regression analysis and the 
discussion on the identified impact of the variables are given in the fifth section. 
The last section summarizes the conclusions of the study and identifies areas for 
further research.
2. Literature review
As mentioned above, the foundations of the theory were set by Modigliani and 
Miller (MM) in 1958, when they conclude that under certain assumptions, the 
value of the firm is not dependent on the financing mix, i.e. the capital structure 
is irrelevant. In 1963, they relaxed the assumption on non-existence of corporate 
taxes, which resulted in the hardly sustainable conclusion that 100% debt is the 
optimal level. Miller’s revision from 1977 in which he takes into account the 
personal income taxes ends with the finding that the differential tax impact on debt 
and equity holders shrinks the previously glorified interest tax shield. The tax-
shield stance has been further supported by DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) through 
the inclusion of non-debt tax shields. Therefore, in the course of two decades, the 
theory on capital structure has been enriched with a number of helpful insights, but 
it has hardly made any advance from the beginning positions regarding the solution 
of the optimal capital structure puzzle (Myers, 1984). The future contributions to 
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the static trade-off theory attempt to overcome one of the biggest weaknesses of the 
MM propositions – the ignoring of the inevitable consequences of overleveraging. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), claim that the benefits of the debt tax shield at some 
point become offset by the direct and indirect costs of borrowing. 
Apart from the purely theoretical reasoning, a more practical line of research 
emerged which deviates from the static view of existence of a target capital 
structure as a predetermined ratio. The so-called pecking order theory announced 
by Myers (1984) and elaborated in more detail in Myers and Majluf (1984) claims 
that instead of targeting a specific debt-equity ratio, the managers follow a sequence 
of steps trying to minimize the negative consequences of information asymmetries. 
Higher leverage could also serve as a preventive device to limit managerial 
discretion over free cash flows (Grossman and Hart, 1982, Jensen, 1986). Baker 
and Wurgler (2002) link the capital structure puzzle to the market timing theory and 
assert that the capital structure is a result of the past decisions of the companies to 
issue equity in periods with the highest market valuations of their shares. 
Harris and Raviv (1991) contend that the empirical research has in most cases 
confirmed the existing theories. However, as a number of determinants of capital 
structure have been identified, “the empirical work has not sorted out which of 
these are important in particular contexts” (Harris and Raviv, 1991, p. 299). Their 
findings have probably initiated the latest wave of research in this field. In the last 
two decades, most of the studies have focused on exploring the significance of 
particular determinants of the capital structure. 
As of the end of the 1990s, most of the studies on the topic have been based on data 
from the mature market economies. However, different institutional settings make it 
impossible to simply transfer the capital structure theory across countries (Booth et 
al., 2001). Only in the recent two decades we have come to see increased academic 
interest to extend the relevance of the capital structure theory to the developing 
countries and the emerging economies. Examples of this trend include Demirgüç-
Kunt and Maksimovic (1999), Booth et al. (2001), Gonenc (2003), Keister (2004), 
Benkato et al. (2005), Teker et al. (2009), etc.
Nivorozhkin is among the first scholars to delve into the area of capital structure in 
the economies in transition. His study on Hungary (2002) concludes that during the 
early stages of capital market development, higher leverage has been characteristic 
for the companies from the manufacturing sector and those in which the state 
retained a larger ownership stake. Later (2004), he investigated the financing 
choices of five EU accession countries. 
Wen et al. (2002) examine the impact of corporate governance on leverage in the 
case of the Chinese listed companies and conclude that the use of debt as a source 
of financing is affected by the composition of the board of directors. Bauer (2004) 
uses a sample of 74 companies listed on the Prague Stock Exchange to explore 
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the most important determinants of their capital structure. In the Balkans, the first 
relevant study is the one by Berk (2007) and later by Črnigoj and Mramor (2009), 
both of them dealing with Slovenian companies. Avarmaa et al. (2011) extend the 
research on capital structure to the companies in the Baltic states.
The findings on the capital structure in the transitional economies are probably 
best enveloped by Delcoure (2007). She asserts that none of the known theories 
provides a satisfactory explanation of the debt-equity choice in these countries. 
Mostly as a result of corporate governance related factors, the companies from 
these countries follow some kind of a “modified pecking order” in the selection of 
financing choices.
3. Research methodology
3.1. Determinants of capital structure in empirical research
Contemporary research on the capital structure decisions generally focuses on 
determining the most important factors that influence the actual capital structure 
of the companies under different settings. Here we provide a brief review of the 
determinants most frequently used in these studies along with the reasons for their 
use. 
Size. The size of the company is expected to be positively related to its level of debt 
because larger companies are perceived as more stable and thus more reliable from 
lenders’ point of view. Additional arguments in favour of this proposition are that 
larger companies usually have more diversified operations, which makes them more 
resistant to shocks in the long run (Rajan and Zingales, 1995) and they are often 
listed on stock exchanges and more transparent, which results in lower agency costs 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976), etc.
However, this relationship is far from unambiguous. According to the theory 
on information asymmetries, size may be inversely related to the amount of 
information available to external investors, who thus might prefer to hold equity 
rather than debt (Rajan and Zingales, 1995).
The size of the company has an additional meaning in our case. Namely, most 
(though not all) of the large companies in this region belong to the group of former 
socialist state-owned enterprises, that managed to survive (and expand) after 
the privatization. These companies still maintain a reputation of longevity and 
sustainability which is helpful with regards to borrowing from banks.
Tangibility of assets. It is expected that asset tangibility should have a positive 
impact on the ability of the company to repay its debt and consequently on the 
willingness of the banks to extend loans to their clients. According to Myers and 
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Majluf (1984), by issuing collateralized debt the companies reduce information 
asymmetries and obtain capital at more favorable terms. This argument is based 
on the accounting treatment of the assets, but their real value as a collateral is 
ambiguous depending on the economic conditions, the specificity of the assets, the 
industry in which the company operates, etc. Additionally, the costs of financial 
distress increase as a result of the uniqueness of the assets when it is linked to the 
uniqueness of the labor skills needed, which lowers the ability of the company to 
borrow (Titman and Wessels, 1988).
Profitability. According to the conventional wisdom, the borrowing needs of the 
profitable companies are lower, which is in line with the pecking order theory 
(Higgins, 1977). On the other hand, the more profitable companies find it easier 
to borrow, as a result of the (presumably) less uncertain cash flows. Also, the 
static trade-off theory implies that the more profitable companies are induced to 
borrow more, because the debt and non-debt tax shields are functional only when 
the company makes profits. These arguments, however, fail to differentiate between 
accounting profits and cash-flows which are far more useful when borrowing needs 
are estimated. The free cash flow theory also supports the view that the companies 
with abundant profits should use more debt as a safeguard from managerial self-
dealing (Jensen, 1986). 
Growth and growth opportunities. These variables are used interchangeably in 
many articles although they are not equivalent. According to the pecking order 
theory, the desire for faster growth at a constant level of profitability necessitates 
the use of more debt. The theory on information asymmetries implies that the 
companies with strong growth potential should avoid issuing new equity because 
the market undervalues their shares. On the other hand, the market timing theory 
asserts that when price-to-book (P/B) ratios are high, which is an indicator of the 
growth potential of a company, issuing equity is advisable (Baker and Wurgler, 
2002). Finally, the trade-off theory links growth to the rising risk of financial 
distress and the accompanying debt-related agency problems, so it predicts a 
negative relationship between growth and leverage (Myers, 1977; Rajan and 
Zingales, 1995).
Tax shields. The earliest recommendations regarding the choice of the optimal 
leverage ratio were related to the debt tax shield (Modigliani and Miller, 1963). The 
tax shield resulting from interest payments should induce increased use of debt. 
Later, the importance of this proposition has been reduced by the trade-off theory. 
Although numerous studies have failed to confirm this relationship, MacKie-Mason 
(1990) provides significant support to this hypothesis using the impact of taxes on 
incremental financing choices. 
The importance of tax shields critically depends on the level of tax rates. One 
should bear in mind that the relative tax burden in many countries today is 
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significantly lower than the one that prevailed in the times of Modigliani’s and 
Miller’s work. Also, the empirical studies in many cases have so far failed to prove 
the utilization of tax shields by the companies in this respect, mostly because 
they have been based on debt/equity ratios, rather than on incremental borrowing 
decisions (MacKie-Mason, 1990, p. 1471).
Risk. The riskiness of the borrower affects the creditors’ attitudes, but it also makes 
prospective investors more cautious. The operational risk of a company is a result 
of the volatility of its earnings and consequently, its cash-flows. A company with 
highly volatile earnings would face higher borrowing costs and its optimal level 
of debt would be lower (Titman and Wessels, 1988). However, from asymmetric 
information theory perspective, the higher volatility increases the systematic risk of 
the company, thus reducing the prospects for issuing new equity (Harris and Raviv, 
1990). Kim and Sorensen (1986) find a positive relation, but Titman and Wessels 
(1988) and Bauer (2004) find no significant relationship between risk and leverage.
Ownership structure. The impact of the structure of company shareholders has been 
explored in a number of studies. In some of them, the division between foreign 
and domestic owners has been determined to have some influence on the capital 
structure (Chen et al., 2013), while in others, the percentage of state ownership 
has been considered as a possible factor (Nivorozhkin, 2002; Al-Najjar and Taylor, 
2008; Chen et al., 2013). Friend and Lang (1988) find that the level of debt is 
higher in the companies with significant managerial ownership. The same finding 
is confirmed by Gonenc (2003) in the case of Turkey, who also asserts that the 
participation of financial institutions and the government in the company has an 
opposite impact. 
Other determinants. The list of potential factors is far from exhaustive and 
numerous authors have investigated the possibility that other variables could have a 
significant influence on the capital structure.
Frank and Goyal (2004) using a sample of American firms throughout a period 
longer than five decades, investigate the impact of stock and debt market conditions, 
as well as macroeconomic settings on leverage. Titman and Wessels (1988) and 
Bauer (2004) analyze the impact of the industry to which the company belongs, 
using a dummy variable.
Using a large sample of firms, Jiraporn and Gleason (2007) analyze the impact of 
shareholder rights on leverage and conclude that there is an inverse relationship 
between the degree of protection of shareholder rights and the level of debt 
used. Berger et al. (1997, p.1436) claim that “leverage is lower when CEOs have 
long tenure in office, have weak compensation incentives and do not face strong 
monitoring from the board or the major shareholders”. The researchers recognize 
that the importance of particular determinants of capital structure varies in different 
Sasho Arsov, Aleksandar Naumoski • Determinants of capital structure: An empirical study... 
126 Zb. rad. Ekon. fak. Rij. • 2016 • vol. 34 • no. 1 • 119-146
situations or among the companies working in different conditions. Booth et al. 
(2001) conclude that the differences among the countries are persistent, so that 
general knowledge is not applicable in each and every particular country.
Apparently, the findings on the capital structure determinants and the sign of their 
impact are ambiguous. For this reason, we provide a review of a number of selected 
studies on this issue, listed by the names of their authors, along with the statistically 
significant regression coefficients. Because of the size of the table, this review is 
placed in Appendix 1.
3.2. Regression model
For the purposes of developing our working hypothesis and an appropriate 
regression model, we have selected the firm-specific variables which have most 
often been analyzed in similar studies. For the selected variables, we apply the 
commonly used proxies. 
Leverage. This is a dependent variable with a key role in the model. The most 
commonly used alternative is the total leverage as a ratio of total liabilities to total 
assets. It is based on the broadest definition of debt and reflects the general division 
of the sources of financing between equity and borrowed funds. Another option is 
the total debt to total assets ratio. Total debt includes only interest-bearing liabilities 
such as long-term and short-term bank debt. In addition to these, we will also use 
another measure of leverage – the long-term debt ratio. Its usage can be justified on 
the ground that short-term borrowing is usually used to cover temporary shortages 
of cash and it has little to do with the long-term capital structure policy of the 
company. 
Size. The proxies most often suggested for company size are the natural log of the 
total assets or the log of sales revenues. As theory suggests, larger companies are 
more reliable as borrowers.
Tangibility of assets. The importance of this variable for our model is augmented by 
the fact that the banks’ lending decisions in these countries extensively rely on the 
available collateral which is mostly found in the companies’ tangible fixed assets. 
The most usual proxy for asset tangibility is the ratio of tangible fixed assets to total 
assets (our choice, too), while an option with the opposite meaning is the amount of 
R&D expenditures, implying higher degree of asset specificity and thus, their lower 
applicability as a collateral (Durnev and Kim, 2005).
Profitability. One of the most logical determinants of the borrowing capacity is the 
profitability of the company. Since most of the studies have shown that the more 
profitable companies need less additional funding (pecking order theory) (Bauer, 
2004; Avarmaa et al., 2011; Kędzior, 2012), we expect a negative sign. We use the 
ratio of operating profit to total assets (ROA) to proxy this variable.
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Growth or growth opportunities. Growth opportunities are usually proxied by the 
price-to-book ratios (P/B), on the basis of the widely accepted interpretation of a 
higher P/B ratio as an indicator that the company with a growth potential is worth 
more than the book value of its assets. 
However, in less liquid capital markets, where share valuations are doubtful and the 
companies’ R&D investments are negligible, a more appropriate proxy could be the 
capital expenditures to total assets ratio or the change in the log of assets (Titman 
and Wessels, 1988). In some cases, the Tobin’s Q is used as a proxy for the growth 
opportunities (Okuda and Nhung, 2012) or the growth rate of the sales in the last 
few years (Črnigoj and Mramor, 2009; Kędzior, 2012).
Having in mind the features of the stock markets in the analyzed countries, the 
amount of fixed capital investments is our first choice. In order to reflect the long-
run effects of investments, we use the ratio between the cumulative three-year 
amount of fixed capital investments from the cash-flow statements and the total 
assets in the last year of the respective three-year period. We expect that companies 
with higher cumulative amounts of fixed asset investments should be more 
leveraged. 
Despite the limitations of the P/B ratio elaborated above, we use it in at least one of 
the model specifications. The trade-off theory and the market timing theory predict 
a negative sign, while the pecking order theory predicts a positive value for this 
variable. Our general expectation is that the regional capital markets are not very 
efficient and the benefits of higher market valuations are unlikely to be seized, so 
we predict a positive sign.
Risk. The riskiness of the borrower is usually measured by the variance of the 
operating profits. We use the standard deviations of company ROAs based on the 
operating income for the last 3 years as a measure of riskiness. The expected sign is 
negative.
Tax shields. The most obvious candidate to proxy the importance of tax shields is 
the effective tax rate, since it incorporates the impact of various tax deductions. It is 
the ratio of the difference between the pre-tax and after-tax earnings and the pre-tax 
earnings. In our study, we have used two-year averages of the effective tax rates in 
order to neutralize the possible impact of tax credits, tax-loss carry-forwards, etc. 
A positive sign for this variable indicates behavior in line with the trade-off theory.
Ownership. The support for the use of this variable is found in the research 
on corporate governance (Berglöf and Pajuste, 2005; Boubaker et al., 2012). 
Concentrated ownership is usually considered harmful to corporate governance and 
thus we find a similarity between insider ownership and concentrated ownership. 
We use the percentage of shares owned by the three largest shareholders as an 
absolute figure. We expect that companies controlled by smaller numbers of 
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dominant shareholders would be prone to borrow more, instead of issuing additional 
equity to prevent loss of control over the company (Jiraporn and Gleason (2007) 
find an inverse relationship between the quality of shareholder rights protection and 
leverage).
We do not consider industry effects because the sample is very diversified and 
the various industries are not sufficiently represented in the sample. Later, in the 
robustness check we make a global division to manufacturing and services sectors. 
The basic regression model we use in this paper can be specified as:
LEVERi,t = α + α1 TANGi,t + α2 SIZEi,t + α3 PROFi,t + α4 INVi,t3y + 
 + α5 GROWTHi,t + α6 RISKi,t3y + α7 TAXi,t2y + α8 OWNi,t + εi,t
The meaning of the regressors is as follows:
– LEVERi,t – leverage of the ith company in period t
– TANGi,t – tangibility of assets of the ith company in period t
– SIZEi,t – size of the ith company in period t
– PROFi,t – profitability of the ith company in period t
– INVi,t3 – fixed assets investments of the ith company in the last three years
– GROWTH i,t – market-to-book ratio of the ith company in period t
– RISKi,t3y – standard deviation of ROA of company i for the past three-year period
– TAXi,t2y – effective tax rate of company i for the past two years (average)
– OWNi,t – percentage of equity held by the top three shareholders of the ith 
company in period t
– εi,t – error term for firm i in period t
4. Empirical data and analysis
For the purposes of our research, we have created a sample consisting of companies 
from these four countries consistent enough to derive conclusions that would be 
helpful in explaining the leverage-related behavior of the corporate executives in 
the region. We have assembled data from the publicly available financial statements 
of the joint-stock companies in the four countries. As a result, the sample is biased 
toward including only joint-stock companies, which, in most cases represent 
privatized former socialist enterprises. Here we must make an important note 
regarding the representativeness of the sample. First, it is only the joint-stock 
companies that are eligible to obtain additional financing by issuing securities, and 
second, all the analyzed economies are rather small, covering a total population of 
about 15 million people, so that the companies in the sample are among the largest 
in the respective countries and account for a major part of their national GDPs. 
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Our database covers the period 2008–2013. The initial sample contained 207 non-
financial companies, but for the purposes of better consistency we have eliminated 
a number of them, such as companies undergoing bankruptcy during a part of 
the analyzed period, companies with insufficient data available or companies 
with negative equity capital. Therefore, the final sample consists of a total of 172 
publicly traded companies (50 companies from Croatia, 53 from Macedonia, 32 
from Slovenia and 37 from Serbia). For some of the included companies, the data 
were not available for the entire analyzed period. The financial sector is excluded 
from this type of analysis, due to the specificity of its capital structure. 
The representativeness of the sample is supported by the fact that the analyzed 
companies represent a significant share in the total market capitalization of the 
publicly traded companies in these countries and the trading with their shares 
accounts for a major part of the total market turnover. All the analyzed countries 
have adopted the use of IFRS and IAS for publicly traded companies. Therefore, 
the financial statements used in this sample can be considered consistent and 
mutually comparable.
In order to set the basis for the analysis, it would be useful to get some idea on the 
basic features of the financial systems of these countries. A summary of financial 
data is presented in table 1. 
Table 1: Basic features of the financial sectors in the analyzed countries
 – values in millions of Euro 
  unless otherwise stated
Data for 2013 Croatia Macedonia Serbia Slovenia
GDP (nominal in billion US dollars) 57.9 10.2 45.5 48.0
GDP per head (PPP, in current dollars) 21,351 11,612 13,020 28,859
Banking sector
Number of banks 30 16 30 17
Total assets 52,356 6,008 25,157 39,700
Total loans to non-financial sectors 34,535 3,282 14,661 32,470
Loan/deposit ratio 93.3% 88.8% 127% 103.2%
Percentage of foreign ownership 89.7 75.20 68.7* 31
Total assets of open-end investment funds 1,706 12.2 46.0 1,860
Total assets of mandatory pension finds 7,623 441 177 1,475
Capital market
Stock market capitalization – all shares 15,573 1,670 5,989 5,200
Capitalization as a % of GDP (all shares) 26.5 20.6 18.7 14.7%
Total market turnover 498.3 52.6 252.0 299.4
Turnover of shares in classical trading ** 355.6 22.7 237.1 288.1
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Table 1 (continuation)
Number of listed companies 23 115 8 10
Share of financial sector assets in GDP 113,3% 89% 80% 162%
Share of banking sector assets in the financial 
sector assets 83% 87,6% 92,4% 75%
Notes: The data shown are end of year figures, except for turnover which is the annual amount. 
 * For Serbia, this is the percentage of foreign-owned banks in the number of total banks. 
 For the other countries, it is the percentage of equity owned by foreign owners. 
 ** Classical trading excludes block trades. 
Sources: Croatian National Bank, HANFA (Croatian Agency for Supervision of Financial 
 Services, National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia; Macedonian Stock Exchange); 
 Serbian National Bank; Belgrade Stock Exchange, Securities and Exchange 
 Commission of Serbia; Slovenian National Bank, Ljubljana Stock Exchange. For GDP: 
 World Bank Data. The table includes authors’ own calculations
Obviously, all the analyzed economies are clearly bank-centered. The share of the 
banking sector assets in the total assets of the financial sector ranges between 75% 
and 92.4%. In all these countries with the exception of Slovenia, most of the banks 
are owned by foreign investors, but it seems that the foreign ownership has not 
resulted in a meaningful improvement of their efficiency (Košak and Čok, 2008). 
After the establishment of the national stock exchanges, the capital markets have 
been developing slowly with a short booming episode around 2007. The IPOs are 
rare, as well as the use of corporate bonds for financing. The number of voluntarily 
listed companies is rather low.
The banks are mostly financed from deposits and the loan-to-deposit ratios rarely 
exceed 100%. In the four countries, the aggregate bank deposits amount to about 
80 billion euros which by far exceeds the total stock market turnover or the total 
market capitalization. It also illustrates the preference of the domestic investors 
towards the various investing opportunities (Ribnikar and Košak, 2011). The ratios 
of stock market capitalization to GDP range between 15% and 40%, but these 
numbers should be taken with caution, because of the very low level of liquidity 
for most of the shares. The stock turnover ratio is around the 5% of the GDP figure, 
while in most of the developed economies it is higher than 20%.3
The descriptive statistics of the sample is included in table 2. 
3 Source: World Bank Database.
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Mean 0.45 0.10 0.23 10.816 0.554 0.032 0.117 0.216 62.89
Median 0.44 0.07 0.20 10.762 0.544 0.029 0.095 0.09 66.10
Max 0.97 0.60 0.86 15.258 0.991 0.470 2.209 18.63 100
Min 0.003 0.00 0.08 6.769 0.155 -0.128 -3.028 -0.093 8.52
StDev 0.223 0.109 0.178 1.642 0.217 0.085 0.223 0.756 23.346
Skew 0.103 0.880 0.544 0.080 0.025 -1.219 -1.35 2.742 -0.337
Kurtos 2.223 2.920 2.567 2.702 2.403 14.105 7.38 11.8 2.099
Source: Authors’ calculations
One would logically expect that the companies in the bank-centered economies 
prefer to use bank loans instead of issuing equity or bonds. However, it tells us 
little about the levels of leverage and its determinants, and it is the purpose of this 
research to determine them. 
5. Results and discussion
Working with panels of data, we are facing the choice between applying fixed 
or random effects models. These techniques enable time-invariant inter-firm 
heterogeneity to be controlled. The use of fixed vs. random effects was based 
on the Hausman test and in the cases where the level of significance of the Chi-
Squared test was lower than 5%, we have applied a fixed effects model and the 
random effects model otherwise. We begin with the assumption that the companies 
in the sample are heterogeneous, so that the fixed effects model would be more 
appropriate, but we use additional tests to prove that proposition. We apply OLS 
regression using several variations of the basic model. The regression results are 
given in table 3.
The first four specifications use the fixed effects model, while in the fifth case, 
the random effects model has proven more appropriate on the basis of the 
Hausman test. The adjusted R2 results indicate that the validity of the last model 
is questionable.
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Table 3: Regression results
Dependent 
variable












-0.0058 2.7849 2.5878 3.4378*** -0.0830
(0.1988) (1.9548) (1.8829) (1.2652) (0.0746)
Tangibility
-0.1624*** -0.1630*** -0.1352*** -0.5728** 0.0738**
(0.0450) (0.0450) (0.0432) (0.2866) (0.0301)
Size
0.0508*** 0.0517*** 0.0885*** -0.2659** 0.0252***
(0.0175) (0.0176) (0.0172) (0.1117) (0.0065)
Profitability
-0.2833*** -0.2854*** -0.3091*** 0.1266 -0.1373***
(0.0492) (0.0491) (0.0556) (0.3129) (0.0390)
Growth 
(investments)
0.0721*** 0.0715*** 0.1217 0.0063







-0.0714 -0.0712 -0.2787*** 1.5712*** 0.0139
(0.0712) (0.0711) (0.0820) (0.4529) (0.0563)
Tax shield (tax 
rate)
-0.0025 -0.0025 -0.0076* -0.0126 -0.0009






observations 972 972 972 972 972
Adjusted R2 0.8457 0.8459 0.8553 0.32257 0.02945
AIC -1.8658 -1.8664 -1.9347 1.8353 n.a.
Prob (F-Statistics) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Model used Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed effects Random effects
Hausman test for 
random effects
(prob. Chi-Sq.)
0.0447 0.0479 0.0011 0.0032 0.2194
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis; * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
Source: Authors’ calculations
As table 3 shows, the variations of the model using the total liabilities as a 
dependent variable seem to have the highest explanatory power, according to the 
adjusted R2 and AIC criteria. Almost all the variables exhibit statistical significance 
in some of the variants of the model, but those that show the highest consistency 
are tangibility, size and profitability. 
It appears that leverage is positively related to the size of the company and 
negatively to the tangibility of the company assets. The size of the company has the 
expected sign in all the model specifications using total leverage and total debt. We 
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interpret the impact of size as an illustration of the better availability of bank credit 
to larger companies in general and the importance of informal relations between 
the lenders and the borrowers, which are quite common in the small countries. This 
result is in line with our first hypothesis and it also corresponds to the results of 
most of the other similar studies, as shown in table A1 in Appendix 1. 
The sign of the asset tangibility regressor is to some extent surprising having in 
mind that the available collateral plays an important role in the banks’ lending 
decisions. It can be explained on the ground that the companies which are already 
better equipped with fixed assets need to invest less and therefore, have lower 
borrowing needs. Other papers exploring the capital structure in the developing 
countries have also found a negative relationship (Booth et al., 2001; Bauer, 2004; 
Črnigoj and Mramor, 2009; Jõeveer, 2013) and these results, especially those 
by Črnigoj and Mramor, based on a sample that overlaps with ours, strengthens 
our confidence in the results obtained, although they contradict some of our 
assumptions. 
More profitable companies tend to borrow less, which is expected and corresponds 
to the pecking order theory. This is a variable with the highest degree of consistency 
in our model. It is also compatible with the findings of most of the other studies. 
Bauer (2004), Nivorozhkin (2004), Berk (2007), Črnigoj and Mramor (2009), 
Avarmaa et al. (2011), Kędzior (2012) are representative for the research stream 
covering the post-transition economies, but the results of Hernádi and Ormos 
(2012) and Jõeveer (2013) in the case of listed firms fail to support this.
The positive sign of the variable representing the investment activity confirms our 
expectation. The companies’ investments in fixed assets in the previous years have 
obviously been backed by increased reliance on external funds. However, models 4 
and 5 do not provide sufficient proof that only bank loans are used for this purpose, 
so we can conclude that not only loans, but also other liabilities increase as a result 
of the investing activity, partially transferring the burden on the company suppliers 
and other stakeholders. Titman and Wessels (1988) obtained an insignificant result 
on this variable, so we lack the basis to make comparisons.
The price-to-book ratios seem to be positively related to leverage. Booth et al. 
(2001), Gonenc (2003) and Črnigoj and Mramor (2009) have found a negative 
relationship, but Titman and Wessels (1988) obtained a positive impact. Our 
positive sign is in accordance with the theory on information asymmetry and the 
pecking order theory, which assert that managers not being able to transfer the 
positive expectations to the investors refrain from issuing shares. Also, in illiquid 
markets the companies are less able to take advantage of the higher valuations 
and “time the market”. The insufficient liquidity and depth of the market are also 
pointed out by Berk (2007) who finds this variable insignificant in the case of the 
Slovenian companies.
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We do not find a reliable relationship between leverage and the volatility of past 
profits, which is not surprising. Being familiar with the practices of the local banks, 
we know that most of the banks’ lending decisions are based on the viability of the 
proposed projects and the collateral provided, while the past volatility plays a minor 
role, if at all. This is compatible with the general stream of research, where only one 
of the studies covering the post-transition economies found a negative relationship 
(Črnigoj and Mramor, 2009), while in all other cases this variable failed to give a 
statistically significant result.
The impact of corporate taxes is also found to be inconclusive, which was expected 
because the corporate income tax rates in the analyzed countries are considerably 
lower than those in Western Europe and the USA, so that the tax shield loses its 
appeal. In the comparable studies, we only find a positive relationship between 
tax rates and leverage in Bauer (2009) and Kędzior (2012), negative in Kim and 
Sorensen (1986) and Booth et al. (2001), while Avarmaa et al. (2011) find no 
significant relationship.
The ownership concentration variable failed to provide significant coefficients. The 
closest comparisons are the papers operating with managerial ownership (Gonenc, 
2003, positive relationship) and insider ownership (Kim and Sorensen, 1986, 
positive). We leave open the possibility that a different proxy could have provided 
better conclusions, so we suggest future studies to pay more attention to the impact 
of company ownership on leverage, especially if more detailed data is available.
To test the robustness of the results, we have run several additional regressions. 
In the first test, we have included only the companies for which complete six-year 
data are available. This accounts for a total of 140 companies. The second check 
is based on the division of companies by sector and for this purpose we divide 
all the companies in two general groups: manufacturing and services (using the 
criteria applied by Antoniou et al., 2008). The third test involves a division of 
the companies by size (large and small), using a 50-50 classification of the entire 
sample by the log of assets criterion. The last test is related to the status of the 
companies as being listed on a stock exchange or not. However, this is not a 
permanent situation, since some of the companies have been delisted during the 
analyzed period and others have applied for listing. The classification criterion we 
have applied is that a company should be included in this subsample if it has been 
listed for at least 4 years out of 6 and we have found 56 such companies. In all 
these variations of the model, the total leverage is used as a dependent variable. The 
results of these tests are given in table 4.
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Industry Size Stock exchange listing 
Manu-
facturing Services Large Small Listed Not listed
Constant
2.601 2.777 0.423** 0.074 0.370** -0.533 0.189
(1.958) (1.917) (0.198) (0.199) (0.187) (0.585) (0.126)
Tangibility
-0.158*** -0.173*** -0.151** -0.163** -0.185*** -0.219*** -0.162***
(0.048) (0.051) (0.077) (0.044) (0.062) (0.076) (0.046)
Size
0.064*** 0.067*** 0.018 0.053** 0.012 0.116*** 0.042***
(0.019) (0.022) (0.015) (0.015) (0.018) (0.035) (0.010)
Profitability
-0.259*** -0.289*** -0.237* -0.471* -0.215*** -0.449*** -0.193***
(0.053) (0.052) (0.141) (0.071) (0.068) (0.120) (0.063)
Investments
0.073*** 0.027 0.044 0.062** 0.082*** 0.026 0.051**
(0.019) (0.025) (0.032) (0.036) (0.022) (0.041) (0.020)
Risk
-0.021 0.038 -0.928*** -0.209* -0.020 0.385* -0.437***
(0.075) (0.075) (0.255) (0.091) (0.104) (0.224) (0.089)
Tax shield
-0.002 -0.002 -0.004 -0.010*** -0.001 -0.007* -0.008
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.016)
Ownership 
concentration
-0.045 -0.047 -0.001 -0.002*** 0.0002 -0.004 -0.001
(0.032) (0.031) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001)
No. of companies 140 125 47 86 86 56 116
No. of 
observations 834 702 270 502 470 311 646
Adjusted R2 0.8353 0.8429 0.134 0.136 0.055 0.8456 0.109
AIC -1.8234 -1.886 - - - -1.857 -
Prob 
(F-Statistics) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000













Hausman test for 
random effects 
(prob. Chi-Sq.)
0.0445 0.0308 0.386 0.1161 0.3580 0.000 0.3545
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
Source: Authors’ calculations
The robustness tests of the regression results increase our confidence in the 
above conclusions. Regardless of the grouping of the companies in the sample, 
leverage is negatively related to the tangibility of assets and the profitability of the 
company. The impact of company size on leverage is also significant among the 
manufacturing and the larger companies, while the perceived relationship between 
the volume of fixed capital investments and the overall leverage is robust to the 
division of companies by size. The capital structure of the companies seems to 
follow almost the same characteristics, regardless of their status as being listed or 
not. The first robustness test is crucial, since it contains only the companies with 
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complete data set for the entire period, and it strongly confirms the findings of 
the general regression model regarding the size, tangibility, profitability and fixed 
capital investments variables.
6. Conclusions
The obtained results of the analysis have shown that the leverage ratios are higher 
among the larger companies and those investing more heavily in fixed assets, while 
the profitability and tangibility of assets have a negative impact on leverage. Only 
the inverse relationship between tangibility and leverage to some extent contradicts 
our expectations, but it does not seem to be an isolated case when developing 
countries are concerned. These results are strongly consistent with the pecking order 
theory, supporting our basic hypothesis that the companies in this region do not set 
a target capital structure. The indicators that validate this conclusion are as follows: 
companies that invest in fixed assets borrow more; companies with higher profits 
borrow less; companies with higher P/B ratios do not issue new equity. The trade-
off theory seems to be unsupported most likely due to the relatively low effective 
tax rates. Most of the results have proven robust to the division of companies by 
size and by industry, while the most important test on the sample containing only 
the companies with complete data set has fully confirmed the initial findings. This 
is the first research to analyze the determinants of capital structure jointly in several 
of the countries that emerged after the collapse of the former Yugoslav federation. 
Being based on a sample of companies sharing the same economic background, the 
research extends the scope of economic insight to the smaller and less frequently 
explored economies in order to achieve better understanding of their functioning 
and provide adequate remedies for the problems perceived. However, the study 
has its own limitations and further research might be useful. First, the number of 
companies in the sample is limited due to the publicly available data, even though 
the size of these economies and their capital markets are such that they can be 
considered sufficiently represented. Second, although with similar backgrounds, the 
analyzed economies are only a small fraction of the post-transition world. Third, 
one must have in mind that the time period covered in the analysis (during and 
after the financial crisis) could have affected the results. Therefore, future research 
on this topic should be based on larger samples, longer time series of data and 
possibly unaffected by external shocks, while broadening the research to other post-
transition economies might provide more reliable and resolute conclusions. There 
are several systemic implications of the obtained results. The observed financing 
patterns of the companies result in constrained corporate growth, stagnation of 
the stock markets, frozen ownership structures and poorer corporate governance 
practices. The economies remain bank-centered. The importance of the informal 
relations between the borrowers and the lenders is detrimental to the development 
of the small and medium enterprises. The governments should put additional efforts 
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to stimulate the primary markets through a development of business angel networks 
or by stimulating the involvement of the investment funds. It would also be useful 
to reduce the costs related to new equity and bond issues, since the relatively small 
amounts of external funding needed rarely justify the costs and efforts of issuing 
securities. Additionally, the governments could make additional efforts to further 
reduce the information asymmetries, although a lot has been done in the recent 
years to increase the transparency of the publicly held companies.
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Determinante strukture kapitala: empirijska studija kompanija iz odabranih 
post-tranzicijskih ekonomija
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Cilj ovog rada je ispitati postoje li determinante koje sustavno utječu na strukturu 
kapitala kompanija na Balkanskom poluotoku i shodno tome, ustvrditi može li se 
neka od postojećih teorija o strukturi kapitala smatrati primjenjivom u njihovom 
slučaju. U istraživanju se koristi panel regresija na primjeru najvećih trgovačkih 
dioničkih društava iz četiriju zemalja. Rezultati regresije pokazuju da veće tvrtke i 
one s većim investicijama u fiksne fondove imaju veći stupanj zaduženosti, dok 
profitabilnije tvrtke i one s većim učešćem materijalnih sredstava u ukupnoj aktivi 
manje koriste financiranje zaduživanjem. Ostale varijable, kao što su koncentracija 
vlasništva tvrtke, rizičnost njene poslovne dobiti i efektivna porezna stopa se nisu 
pokazale statistički značajnima. Ovi rezultati, podržani testovima robusnosti, 
potvrdili su naša očekivanja da menadžeri u ovim zemljama ne postavljaju ciljne 
kvocijente zaduženosti, već umjesto toga poštuju određeni red u odabiru izvora 
financiranja. Iz toga proizlazi da se najrelevantnijom od postojećih teorija može 
smatrati teorija redoslijeda financiranja. Ekonomskim politikama u analiziranim 
zemljama treba posvetititi veću pozornost u promoviranju ostalih izvora 
financiranja, kako bi smanjile preveliku ovisnost kompanija o bankarskom sektoru.
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